WordPress Redirection 2.7.3 Remote File Inclusion

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  • WordPress Redirection plugin version 2.7.3 suffers from a remote file inclusion vulnerability.
    MD5 | ad8fd6f0edda2fb7d07a6e8d56138be6

    Software: Redirection  
    Version: 2.7.3  
    Homepage: https://wordpress.org/plugins/redirection/  
    Advisory report: https://advisories.dxw.com/advisories/ace-file-inclusion-redirection/  
    CVE: Awaiting assignment  
    CVSS: 9 (High; AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C)  
    ACE via file inclusion in Redirection allows admins to execute any PHP file in the filesystem  
    If you are logged in as an administrator on any site by using the setup page for the redirection plugin you can run arbitrary code and completely compromise the system.  
    This is done by writing the URL to redirect to in the format file://path/to/file/here. Unfortunately the plugin executes any PHP within that file. This means that any file with any extension on the filesystem that contains a small amount of user controlled data can be turned into a back door. The plugin also has the functionality to create files and place user controlled data in them. This results in attacker controlled code running and complete compromise of the system.  
    When the code for handling a redirect looks at the URL to redirect to it does the following:  
    class Pass_Action extends Red_Action {  
    function process_before( $code, $target ) {  
    // Determine what we are passing to: local URL, remote URL, file  
    if ( substr( $target, 0, 7 ) === \'http://\' || substr( $target, 0, 8 ) === \'https://\' ) {  
    echo @wp_remote_fopen( $target );  
    else if ( substr( $target, 0, 7 ) === \'file://\' ) {  
    $parts = explode( \'?\', substr( $target, 7 ) );  
    if ( count( $parts ) > 1 ) {  
    // Put parameters into the environment $args = explode( \'&\', $parts[1] );  
    if ( count( $args ) > 0 ) {  
    foreach ( $args as $arg ) {  
    $tmp = explode( \'=\', $arg );  
    if ( count( $tmp ) === 1 )  
    $_GET[ $arg ] = \'\';  
    $_GET[ $tmp[0] ] = $tmp[1];  
    include( $parts[0] );  
    else {  
    $_SERVER[\'REQUEST_URI\'] = $target;  
    if ( strpos( $target, \'?\' ) ) {  
    $_SERVER[\'QUERY_STRING\'] = substr( $target, strpos( $target, \'?\' ) + 1 );  
    parse_str( $_SERVER[\'QUERY_STRING\'], $_GET );  
    return true;  
    The above code behaves as expected if the url to redirect to is a HTTP or HTTPS URL.  
    If the URL begins with file:// it passes the path to the include function.  
    Its also worth mentioning that if the URL is not http, https or file, then the code allows the $_GET parameter to be contaminated with unescaped values, which may result in SQL injections.  
    Proof of concept  
    echo a<?php phpinfo();a > dog-meme.jpg  
    Visit /wp-admin/media-new.php  
    Upload dog-meme.jpg  
    Copy the URL of the file (i.e. http://localhost/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/dog-meme.jpg)  
    Visit /wp-admin/tools.php?page=redirection.php  
    Fill aSource URLa with a/testa  
    Fill aTarget URLa with afile:///var/www/html/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/dog-meme.jpga (this will probably require some modification if your WP installation is at a different path or dog-meme.jpg is saved in a different directory)  
    Set aGroupa to aRedirectionsa  
    Press aAdd Redirecta  
    Press aEdita on the newly added redirect  
    Press the cog icon  
    Set aWhen matcheda to aPass-througha  
    Press aSavea  
    Upgrade to version 2.8 or later.  
    Disclosure policy  
    dxw believes in responsible disclosure. Your attention is drawn to our disclosure policy: https://advisories.dxw.com/disclosure/  
    Please contact us on [[email protected]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) to acknowledge this report if you received it via a third party (for example, [[email protected]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection)) as they generally cannot communicate with us on your behalf.  
    This vulnerability will be published if we do not receive a response to this report with 14 days.  
    2017-10-02: Discovered  
    2017-10-03: Reported via website contact form  
    2017-10-04: Response received. Plugin author reports this as intended behaviour, as  
    it is assumed that the administrator has full access to the system. However, also future version will include a fix.  
    2017-10-18: Author reported fixed in 2.8  
    2018-06-12: Advisory published  
    Discovered by dxw:  
    Glyn Wintle  
    Please visit advisories.dxw.com for more information.  

    Source: packetstormsecurity.com

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